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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
State of Ohio ex rel. ) 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD, ) 
) 
Relater, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
RALPH ALVIS, Warden of ) 
the Ohio Penitentiary, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
No. 35777 
ANSWER BRIEF OF RELATOR 
The brief of the Attorney General concedes that Revised 
Code Section 2725.05 is no bar to issuance of the writ if some-
thing extraordinary occurred, prior to judgment, which deprived 
the court of its normal jurisdiction to impose sentence. 
It is our position that such extraordinary event did 
occur - namely, the concealment and suppression by the state of 
material evidence beneficial to relater which in all probability 
would have changed the verdict had it been revealed - that this 
was a denial of due process which voided the trial, made the whole 
proceeding a sham and a pretense, and destroyed the court's juris-
diction to impose sentence. 
The Prosecutor's entire case was tried and submitted on 
the theory that during the night of July )rd and the early morn-
ing of July 4th, 1954, there never was anyone in the Sheppard home 
except the relater, his wife Marilyn, and his young son; that there 
was no evidence of forcible entry and no evidence that any third 
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person was present; that the relator's description of a bushy haired 
intruder was a figment of his imagination and that there was no such 
person; that there was no car parked along Lake Road near the Shep-
pard residence; that the young son did not commit the murder; that 
relater was the only other person who could have done it and that 
he therefore must have done it. 
The evidence which we have alleged was suppressed would 
establish that an outside door to the Sheppard home (not the door 
referred to in the brief of the Prosecuting Attorney) had been forced, 
that a car was parked on Lake Road near the Sheppard home at the time 
of the murder, that later that morning a bushy haired man whose cloth-
ing was spattered with brownish spots was seen on Lake Road west of 
the Sheppard home and that blood found on Marilyn Sheppard's wrist 
watch was not the blood of the relater or of Marilyn, but was the 
blood of a third person. Had all these facts been laid before the 
jury, who can say that in all probability the jury would not have 
set the relater free? Just the proof that the blood was the blood 
of a third person should have been enough. 
This evidence would have gone far beyond raising a reason-
able doubt about relator's guilt. It would have upset the state's 
entire case. It would have proved that a third person was in the 
house and that his blood was on Marilyn's watch. 
The brief filed by the Prosecuting Attorney denies that 
there was any concealment or suppression. Attached to this brief as 
Appendix A is a photostat of the front and back sides of a card 
which was the original record in the office of the Coroner of Cuya-
hoga County on which was reported the tests made of the blood on 
3. 
the deceased woman's watch. Contrary to what is said at page 6 of 
the brief filed by the Prosecuting Attorney, this record was not 
made available to the defense, nor did the defense know of its ex-
istence, before the trial. This card shows that Mary Cowan, the 
coroner's technician, ran the tests twice and found slight agglutin-
ation of both A and B cells both times. Neither relator's blood nor 
the blood of his murdered wife contained any B cells, so that not 
even a trace of B could have been obtained from their blood. The 
blood on Marilyn's watch has to be the blood from some third person. 
Once that fact has been established the other evidence which was 
suppressed is especially significant. 
This record also shows on its face that it was turned over 
to the Prosecutor's office on November 4, 1954, at 10:27 A.M. Al-
most four weeks later, on November 30, 1954, the Prosecutor put 
Mary Cowan on the stand. The Prosecutor did not offer this card in 
evidence. Without producing the card Mary Cowan testified that tests 
had been made of the blood on the murdered woman's 
results were "inconclusive'{~ · 40~ ~ ~~ss-examina ti on 
I\ 
that the tests were inconclusive. (.'R., +1 S""~ ) . 
watch and that the 
she reiterated 
There can be no doubt whatsoever that when she made that 
statement, both the witness and the Prosecutor knew that the tests 
showed the presence of B cells. 
The state may call this "trivia" . We do not. We submit 
that it is vital information that should have been revealed if the 
accused were to have the kind of fair trial that comports with due 
process as guaranteed by the constitution. We agree that the Prose-
cuting Attorney does not have to make the case for the defense, but 
we believe that the facts of this case bring it squarely within the 
4. 
principles announced in State v. Rhoads, 81 O. s. 397 at 424, when 
the court said that a Prosecuting Attorney 
"should not endeavor to convict an innocent person, and he 
should not suppress or conceal evidence that might tend to 
acquit the prisoner." 
Under the constitution relater was guaranteed a fair trial 
and due process of law. The authorities are plain that if those 
were denied to him the conviction was void and the writ of habeas 
corpus must be granted. The suppression by the prosecution of mater-
ial evidence favorable to the defendant is a denial of due process 
for which habeas corpus will be granted. 
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216, 63 s. Ct. 177, 178 
87 L. Ed. 214; 
United States ex rel Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382; 
United States ex rel Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F. (2d) 815, 
certiorari denied 345 U.S. 904, rehearing denied 
345 U.S. 946, where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
said at page 820: 
"We think that the conduct of the Commonwealth as out-
lined in the instant case is in conflict with our fundament-
al principles of liberty and justice. The suppression of 
evidence favorable to Almeida was a denial of due process. 
In Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216, 63 S. Ct. 177, 178, 
87 L. Ed. 214, the Supreme Court of the United States said 
that allegations of 'perjured testimony, knowingly used by 
the State authorities to obtain [aJ conviction, and.,, .. *{:-
the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evi-
dence favorable to [a defendanfJ * ~'" ~-' sufficiently charge 
a deprivation of rights guaranteed bY. the Federal Constitu-
tion, and, if proven, would entitle fpimJ to release from 
his present custody. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 
s. ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791. 1 The decision cited is the con-
trolling authority. It has been such for seventeen years." 
On the same theory, the dueprocess clause is violated where 
the state denies the accused the aid of counsel, Powell v. Alabama, 
287 u.s. 45, or where a conviction has been obtained by violence and 
torture, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278. As the court said in 
the latter case at page 286: 
"The due process clause requires 'that state action, 
whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent 
with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political in-
stitutions.' Hebert vs. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316. 11 
The same theory underlies the numerous cases in which 
the use by the prosecution of testimony known to be perjured has 
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been recognized as a denial of due process and ground for granting 
habeas corpus. 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103; 
White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760; 
Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 316 U.S. 642. 
At page 5 of his brief, the Attorney General cites the 
case of Jones v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 779, on what constitutes 
"due process of law". This is a famous case, which is also reported 
in 267 Ky. 465, 102 S.W. (2d) 345, and in 269 Ky. 772, 108 S.W. (2d) 
812. In that case the perjury was not known to the prosecution at 
the time of trial, but was discovered after the time for filing a 
motion for new trial had run. The highest court of Kentucky denied 
relief, but the convicted man went into the federal courts which 
took a broader view of what due process requires and granted the 
writ of habeas corpus. In Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 97 
F. (2d) 335, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had this to say 
at page 338: 
"The concept of due process as it has become crystal-
lized in the public mind and by judicial pronouncement, 
is formulated in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 
S. Ct. 340, 341, 342, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406. Its 
requirement in safe-guarding the liberty of the citizen 
against deprivation through the action of the state embodies 
• 
those 'fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at 
the base of our civil and political institutions,' referred 
to in Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316, 317, 47 s. 
Ct. 103, 71 L. Ed. 270, 48 A.L.R. 1102. This requirement 
cannot be satisfied 'By mere notice and hearing if a state 
has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial 
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defend-
ant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and 
jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. 
Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction 
and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like 
result by intimidation.' If it be urged that the concept 
thus formulated but condemns convictions obtained by the 
state through testimony known by the prosecuting officers 
to have been perjured, then the answer must be that the 
delineated requirement of due process in the Mooney Case 
embraces no more than the facts of that case require, and 
that 1 the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at 
the base of our civil and political institutions' must 
with equal abhorrence condemn as a travesty a conviction 
upon perjured testimony if later, but fortunately not too 
late, its falseness is discovered, and that the state in 
the one case as in the other is required to afford a cor-
rective judicial process to remedy the alleged wrong, if 
constitutional rights are not to be impaired." 
The net result of the above authorities is that where a 
false picture has been presented to the court and jury, whether 
it be by the use of perjured testimony or the suppression of mat-
erial evidence favorable to the defendant, or by false evidence 
6. 
obtained by violence and intimidation of witnesses, or by failure 
to supply the defendant with adequate counsel, the requirements of 
due process have not been met, the trial is void ab initio, and 
habeas corpus must be granted. 
"Due course of law" in Article I Section 16 of the Ohio 
Constitution is the same as "due process of law" in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. State v. French, 71 o.s. 
186 at 201 • 
4 
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Certainly the suppression by the state of the evidence 
set forth in relator's petition for habeas corpus was not consistent 
with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice set forth 
above, and if that suppression is proven, it can not be said that 
relater had a fair trial or was given due process of law. 
The full effect of this suppression of evidence on re-
lator1 s right to a fair trial can not be determined until the court 
hears the evidence. Neither the Prosecuting Attorney nor the Attor-
ney General has heard any of this new evidence. Their briefs are 
drawn as if such evidence had already been introduced. They draw 
conclusions, which, of course, are erroneous, from facts that have 
not yet been established. The assertion of evidence that will be 
introduced under the petition as amended is not evidence that is 
in the record. This evidence, which is entirely new as far as the 
record is concerned, has been obtained after long and difficult in-
vestigation and its value cannot be determined by this Court on 
opinions expressed by opposing counsel before it is heard. 
Relater is entitled to a hearing in order to establish 
the facts set forth in his petition. On this point we call atten-
tion to the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel Herman v. 
Clouty, 350 U.S. 116, 100 L. Ed. 126. Eight years after conviction 
upon his plea of guilty and after sentence, the petitioner filed a 
petition for habeas corpus in the same court where he had been con-
victed, asking that his conviction be held invalid as in violation 
of the due process clause. He alleged that his plea of guilty was 
the result of coercion and that he had not been given the benefit 
• 
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of counsel. The state filed an answer denying the allegations and 
the Pennsylvania court dismissed the petition summarily without any 
hearing. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and re-
manded the case, holding that the petitioner could not be denied a 
hearing just because the Prosecuting Attorney denied the charges. 
The court said at 350 U.S. page 123: 
"The chief argument made by the State here in support 
of the court's summary dismissal of the petition is this: 
'Counsel for petitioner argues that since facts are al-
leged in the petition, a hearing must be held. Since our 
answer contradicted the allegations in the petition, the 
lower court was not required to grant a hearing. This 
contention was sustained by the Superior Court. 1 We can-
not accept this argument. Under the allegations here pe-
titioner is entitled to relief if he can prove his charges. 
He cannot be denied a hearing merely because the allega-
tions of his petition were contradicted by the prosecuting 
officers." 
All that relator asks is a chance to prove that the evi-
dence was suppressed. Why are such strenuous efforts being made 
to prevent him from making this proof? Who is afraid to have the 
truth come out, and why? Is it because of any real belief that 
further litigation will be "oppressive" as charged by the Prosecut-
ing Attorney? Or is it because certain persons are afraid to let 
the truth be known, and would rather let an innocent man rot in the 
penitentiary than admit that they made a mistake? 
Relator was not only tried "in the atmosphere of a Roman 
holiday" as this Court so aptly described his trial, but he was 
convicted through the suppression of material evidence. His con-
viction is a gross miscarriage of justice, a blot on the adminis-
• 
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tration of justice in this state. The writ of habeas corpus is 
the only available remedy to right this wrong. Under the above 
authorities it should be granted . 
Respectfully submitted, 
Fred w. Garmone 
Attorneys for Relator . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that three copies of the foregoing 
Answer Brief of Relator have been mailed this /J~ day of .March, 
.. 
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1959, to .Mark .McElroy, Attorney General, State House Annex, Colum-
bus, Ohio, and to John T. Corrigan, Prosecuting Attorney of Cuya-
hoga County, Criminal Courts Building, 1560 East 21st Street, 
Cleveland, Ohio . 
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APPENDIX A 
In re: !'1ARILYN SHEPP ARD 
Casef 76~29 
Autopsy M 7280 
Test for ------------.3~0. f TE 108 
Source of Specimen: She p t;)ard hd~e. Ideiit1f1ed by 
~r . s . n . Gerber as property of •arllyn Sheppar~ 
3ubmitted by Dr. s.R. Gerber · ob. Coroner • 
name --119~~ncy ....------........ ..-.... 
at 10:50 - AM· 7-6-54 Rec~d by M.Cowan I 
Description of Specimen 1 stoppered vial contalnlng 
1 l qdy ' :- yel l '.1w metal wrist · watch (Hamilton) 
·Ni th y~llow motal WIJl.iij>an~. Watch has stopped 
t i me i :ld .:. c a: ed: 3:1,--- .· 
. card 
..... ... 
Benz!d1ne ··test L~bor.atocy Exananatl~ 
. .. ,, . . : . . .... .....,. . ;;;,;, " 
on sta i n s on ws t ch-- positive • . Crusted stains ~-. . 
remo ~ied and tested fon .ag lu_t 1n1i:is against· # 
. .. . ·-· 
kno~n A, B, &O cells rec'd from R. ~irsters (llt40 
·a .a. 7- 7 - 54 ) .. Results inconclusive al tho the~e 
ap p__, .1 1~sr. to be sl ight aggluti~tlon ot otli A .. 
